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ROYAL GLOBE REVISITED: STANDARDS FOR THE
MATURITY OF A THIRD-PARTY ACTION
Guy 0. Kornblum* and Glen R. Olson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the California Supreme Court in Royal Globe
Insurance Co. v. Superior Court' removed many of the barriers
third-party claimants, and perhaps others," usually encountered in
bringing a direction against an insurer for wrongful handling of a
claim under an insurance policy.' The basis for a third party's Royal
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* J.D., Hastings College of the Law, 1966; Senior Partner, Kornblum, Kelly & Her-
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1. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979). See Kornblum, Royal
Globe Insurance Company v. Superior Court: Its Impact on Litigation Involving Insurers, 15
FORUM 67 (1980), republished in 29 DEF. L.J. 355 (1980); Comment, Bad Faith: Defining
Applicable Standards In The Aftermath Of Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 917 (1983).
2. For instance, in Williams v. Transport Indem. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 953, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 868 (1984), the wife of a deceased third-party claimant sued an insurer who failed to
effect a settlement prior to her husband's death for, inter alia, negligent infliction of emotional
distress. The reviewing court in Williams held that although the plaintiff was a foreseeable
victim for purposes of establishing her own claim (see Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal.
3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980)), her action was dependent upon the duties
owed to her husband under the Insurance Code. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 964, 203 Cal. Rptr. at
875. However, the court concluded that the plaintiff's personal action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, as well as the action for violation of CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h), was
barred for lack of a prior determination of the insured's liability. Id. The Williams case is
discussed in further detail, infra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
3. Insurance policies in California must contain a provision permitting the enforcement
of a judgment in a separate action against an insurer of the policy "subject to its terms and
limitations .... " CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(b)(2). Notwithstanding the above provision, a
third-party's rights were limited prior to the Royal Globe opinion. First, in the case of an
excess verdict, a third-party claimant could enforce the insured's claim for breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing if there was an assignment of this claim from the insured to
the third-party claimant enforcing it. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d
587, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976); Purcell v. Colonial Ins. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 807, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 874 (1971). However, even with an assignment, the third-party could only recover the
amount of the excess judgment over and above the liability limits. The insured's personal
claims for emotional distress and punitive damages pursuant to CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294 were
not assignable. Murphy, 17 Cal. 3d at 942, 553 P.2d at 387, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
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Globe action is set forth in that opinion and in the provisions of
California Insurance Code section 790.03(h)' to the extent that these
provisions are applicable to a third party's claim against an insurer.5
4. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) contains 15 subsections setting forth various unfair
claims settlement practices. These are:
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indicate a
general business practice any of the following unfair settlement practices:
(I) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions
relating to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications
with respect to claims arising under insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investi-
gation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after
proof of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settle-
ments of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an
insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately re-
covered in actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made
claims for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle claims by an insured for less than the amount to which
a reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or
printed advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.
(8) Attempting to settle a claim on the basis of an application which was altered
without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative,
agent, or broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon
request by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appeal-
ing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of
compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount in
arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured,
claimant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and
then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of
which submissions contain substantially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent,
under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settle-
ments under other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on
in the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial
of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney.
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.
CAL. INS. CODE §790.03(h) (West Supp. 1985). The statute as adopted in California is a slight
modification of the Model Unfair Claims Practices Act proposed by the Nat'l Assoc. of Ins.
Comm'rs. The California version of those provisions of the Model Act set forth in CAL. INS.
CODE § 790.03(h) adds subsections (14) and (15).
5. Some of the subsections of CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) may not be applicable to
actions by third-party claimants. In particular, subsections (h)(2) (regarding failure to ac-
knowledge and act promptly on communications with respect to claims under an insurance
ROYAL GLOBE REVISITED
However, under Royal Globe, a third-party claimant may sue
an insurer directly for violation of California Insurance Code section
790.03, subsections (h)(5) and (h)(14). These subsections provide
that it is an unfair trade practice for one "in the business of insur-
ance" to refrain from attempting to effectuate a prompt, fair and
equitable settlement and to directly advise a claimant not to obtain
the services of an attorney.6 Yet, under the Royal Globe decision, an
action may not be brought until the "conclusion" of the underlying
action.' The Royal Globe court cited three policies underlying this
holding: (1) to prevent the prejudicial use of evidence of insurance
against the insured in the underlying action; (2) to prevent the ham-
pering of the defense of the insured by discovery initiated against the
insurer; and (3) to facilitate the determination of the damages suf-
fered by the injured party as a result of the insurer's failure to set-
tle.' As a result of the "conclusion" requirement, a question now
facing our courts in Royal Globe actions by third parties is: precisely
when is a third-party claim mature for purposes of bringing a "sec-
ond suit" predicated on an insurer's violation of the Unfair Practices
Act?
The Royal Globe requirement that a third-party action against
an insurer for violation of the California Insurance Code be deferred
until after the "conclusion" of the underlying action is strongly
rooted in public policy. Permitting two actions to be asserted simul-
taneously, particularly in the context of a joint suit against insurer
and insured, subverts the policy against disclosing evidence to a trier
of fact of the existence and amount of insurance coverage.9 The
Royal Globe opinion was also based upon the more practical consid-
eration that it is futile to permit the "second suit" to be brought until
the damages in the underlying action are ascertained.'0
policy) and (h)(3) (regarding the failure to implement standards for the prompt investigation
and processing of claims) may not be available in third-party actions. See Beckham v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of Am., 691 F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1982); Avila v. Travelers Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 658,
661 (9th Cir. 1981).
6. See supra note 4.
7. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 23 Cal. 3d at 892, 592 P.2d at 336-37,153 Cal.
Rptr. at 850.
8. Id.
9. This policy is well-entrenched. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1155; Roche v. Llewel-
lyn Iron Works Co., 140 Cal. 563, 577, 74 P. 147, 153 (1903); Crawford v. Alioto, 105 Cal.
App. 2d 45, 55, 233 P.2d 148, 155 (1951).
10. See supra note 7. For example, assume the insured is found not liable to the third-
party claimant. Does an insurer still have liability to a third-party claimant if it refuses a
"nuisance" settlement and forces the third-party to try a weak case? Suppose a low limits
policy demand is rejected by the insurer. After a much larger excess verdict is returned, the
19851
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Thus, two issues undecided by the Royal Globe opinion are: (1)
what constitutes a "conclusion" of the underlying action; and (2)
whether a determination of the liability of the insured in the under-
lying action is a necessary element of such a conclusion. Rather than
simply raising questions of timing, these issues go directly to the sub-
stantive requirements for bringing a third-party action against an
insurer.' Recently, the California courts of appeal have grappled
with the "conclusion" concept in an attempt to clarify the situations
in which Royal Globe actions can, and cannot, be brought. This arti-
cle analyzes these opinions in the context of three situations: (1)
Royal Globe actions brought prior to the entry of a final judgment in
the underlying action; 2 (2) Royal Globe actions brought following
settlements reached with or without underlying litigation;"3 and (3)
Royal Globe actions brought without settlements or underlying
litigation. 4
As the above situations illustrate, the concept of a "conclusion"
or "termination" for purposes of a third-party bad faith suit is one
which is continually evolving in the California appellate courts'" and
requires clarification from the California Supreme Court. In particu-
lar, the controversial area of Royal Globe actions following settle-
ments requires resolution."
insurer immediately pays the excess and satisfies the judgment against the insured. What dam-
ages can the third-party claimant then assert against the insurer for a violation of §
790.03(h)(5)'s requirement that the insurer attempt in good faith to effectuate a prompt, fair
and equitable settlement after liability has become reasonably clear?
11. Although most typically raised in the context of an action by a third-party claimant
for violation of CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03, the "conclusion" requirement extends also to an
action by an insured against the insurer for failure to properly handle a liability suit. Such an
action would generally proceed as one for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
See, e.g., Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App. 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1964). It is not
clear whether the "conclusion" requirement applies to a first party case in which an insured
asserts bad faith failure to pay benefits under an accident, health, or disability policy. How-
ever, some subsections of CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) do apply to such actions. See Colonial
Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 31 Cal. 3d 785, 647 P.2d 86, 183 Cal. Rptr. 810
(1981).
12. See infra notes 17-57 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 58-82 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
15. In particular, as discussed in Section II, infra, a major issue is whether Royal Globe
requires a determination of the liability of the insured in the underlying action, or whether
Royal Globe only prevents a simultaneous action against insurer and insured.
16. Such an opinion may be forthcoming in Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group, 153 Cal. App.
3d 706, 200 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1984), hearing granted, May 31, 1984. See infra notes 31-37 and
accompanying text.
1985] ROYAL GLOBE REVISITED
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE "CONCLUSION" REQUIREMENT BY
THE CALIFORNIA COURTS OF APPEAL
A. Royal Globe Actions in the Absence of a Final Judgment
In situations in which the underlying litigation is in progress
and a second suit1 is simultaneously pursued against an insurer, an
interesting question arises: when is the underlying suit against the
insured sufficiently "mature" for Royal Globe purposes? California
courts, addressing this scenario, have held in several cases that the
underlying suit was not "concluded" for purposes of a second suit
under Royal Globe.
1. Doser v. Middlesex Mutual Insurance Co.
An opinion following the Royal Globe decision, Doser v. Mid-
dlesex Mutual Insurance Company,"8 indicates some of the policy
considerations underlying Royal Globe's conclusion requirement.
Doser involved a third party's action for violation of the implied cov-
enant of good faith and fair dealing following a stipulated judgment
in the underlying suit and an assignment of the insured's bad faith
claim to the third party. 9 While not an action for breach of statu-
tory duties, the Doser opinion contains enlightening commentary on
the policies relating to the maturity of a "second suit."
The Doser case involved an airplane accident in which both the
pilot (Kelly) and his passenger (Doser) were killed. Kelly was a
member of a flying club whose participants were insured by the de-
fendant Middlesex Mutual Insurance Company. Kelly's estate was
virtually worthless at the time of the accident.
The Doser heirs subsequently filed a wrongful death action
against Kelly's estate. A demand was then made upon Middlesex to
defend the estate. An agent for Middlesex, Omni Aviation Manag-
ers, provided a defense for the flying club but did not provide a de-
fense for the pilot's estate. Omni also denied the Doser heirs'
$100,000 demand for the policy limits."
Prior to any significant involvement by Middlesex in the
wrongful death action, the pilot's estate entered into a settlement for
$980,000, a condition of which was the assignment of all claims
17. The "second suit" based upon Royal Globe may be filed separately, or joined with
the underlying action as was done in Royal Globe. See, e.g., Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065
(Mont. 1983) (suit against insurer properly joined with suit against insured).
18. 101 Cal. App. 3d 883, 162 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1980).
19. Id. at 889, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 118.
20. id.
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against Middlesex to the Doser heirs. The Doser heirs then insti-
tuted a bad faith action against Middlesex, seeking $980,000 in
damages. The jury in the trial court action returned a special verdict
finding that Middlesex had breached the duty of good faith and fair
dealing by failing to defend the Kelly estate and by failing to accept
the policy limits demand of the Doser heirs. The jury also found that
the Kelly estate had breached the implied covenant in its dealings
with Middlesex. Judgment was entered for Middlesex and the Doser
heirs appealed.
On appeal, Middlesex argued that, because the wrongful death
action against the Kelly estate had been dismissed,21 no cause of ac-
tion existed to assign to the third-party claimants. The court of ap-
peal observed in its opinion that in the analogous situation of a
Royal Globe action, no cause of action arises in favor of the third-
party claimant until the liability of the insured is first determined. 22
Because the alleged breach of the duty to settle28 only presented the
possibility of a judgment in excess of the policy limits, the reviewing
court held that the Doser heirs' assigned cause of action was inva-
lid.24 Of particular concern to the court was the fact that no judge or
jury had ever determined the amount of the Doser heirs' damages
and the settlement amount appeared to be excessive.2"
2. Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Superior Court
Following Doser, the Fourth District Court of Appeal consid-
ered the concept of the conclusion of the underlying action in Na-
tionwide Insurance Co. v. Superior Court.2 In Nationwide, a case
arising out of an automobile accident and liability policy, the third
party claimant obtained a judgment against the insured, from which
the insured appealed. While the appeal was pending, the claimant
instituted an action against Nationwide alleging that it had acted
wrongfully in failing to negotiate a settlement and thus had violated
California Insurance Code section 790.03.
The trial court overruled Nationwide's demurrer to the third-
21. Id. at 888, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 118. The wrongful death action was dismissed approxi-
mately four years after the execution of the assignment.
22. Id. at 891, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
23. The estate also appeared to have a fully matured cause of action for breach of the
duty to defend. Although the Doser opinion did not address this issue, there is authority to the
effect that a bad faith refusal to defend can result in an award of extra-contractual damages.
See, e.g., Tibbs v. Great American Ins. Co., 755 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985).
24. 101 Cal. App. 3d at 894, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 121.
25. Id. at 892, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 120.
26. 128 Cal. App. 3d 697, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1982).
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party claimant's complaint. The court of appeal issued a writ di-
recting the trial court to vacate its order. The Nationwide court held
that the judgment was not final while the appeal was still pending;
accordingly, the Royal Globe action was premature."7 The court, cit-
ing Doser, also observed that Royal Globe held that the third-party
claimant's damages may best be ascertained after the conclusion of
the underlying action.2" The court expressly rejected the argument
that a judgment is final for Royal Globe purposes when it is final for
the purpose of taking an appeal.29
Thus, Nationwide, while focusing on the issue of finality of a
judgment, also referred to the Royal Globe policy relating to ascer-
taining the third-party claimant's damages after conclusion of the
underlying suit. Doser, in contrast, focuses on the requirement of
determining liability of the insured in the underlying case. These
considerations may have the greatest impact in the context of "second
suits" following settlements, because often such settlements lack indi-
cia of liability on the part of the insured.30
3. Coleman v. Gulf Insurance Group
In contrast to the Nationwide opinion is the vacated opinion of
the Second District Court of Appeal in Coleman v. Gulf Insurance
Group."1 In Coleman, the children of a deceased person brought suit
27. Id. at 715-16, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
28. Id. at 714, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 466. The Nationwide court noted that its holding was
supported by the general rule of indemnity law that no right to indemnity accrues until recov-
ery of a final judgment against the indemnitee. Id. at 714-15, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 466-67.
The Nationwide court also observed that "[in view of its reasoning, the court's language
in Royal Globe until the liability of the insured is first determined and after the conclusion of
the action by the third party claimant against the insured could only have reference to a final
determination and conclusion, a final judgment." Id. at 714, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
29. Id. at 715, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
30. The Doser/Nationwide approach to the "maturity" question may tend to discourage
Royal Globe actions following settlements, and thus shield insurers from unfair practices in
such settlements. See infra notes 58-82 and accompanying text.
31. 153 Cal. App. 3d 706, 200 Cal. Rptr. 619, hearing granted, May 31,1984. Although
Coleman is presently before the California Supreme Court and the court of appeal opinion has
no precedential effect, the opinion raises issues which the California Supreme Court may re-
solve in its forthcoming opinion. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying Service v. Standard Oil Co.
of California, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984). The
Seaman's court avoided the question of whether a breach of any contract gives rise to an action
for breach of the implied covenant. The court noted in this regard that: "For the purposes of
this case it is unnecessary to decide the broad question which Seaman's poses. Indeed, it is not
even necessary to predicate liability on a breach of the implied covenant. It is sufficient to
recognize that a party to a contract may incur tort remedies when, in addition to breaching the
contact, he seeks to shield himself from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable
cause, that the contract exists." Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
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for wrongful death against the City of Monrovia, which was insured
by the defendant, Gulf Insurance Group. The heirs obtained a ver-
dict against the city in the amount of $350,000, and an appeal was
taken on the city's behalf by Gulf. The appeal was subsequently
dismissed after the parties settled the underlying action.
Following dismissal of the appeal, the Coleman heirs initiated a
bad faith action, alleging that Gulf violated California Insurance
Code section 790.03. Gulf demurred to the heirs' complaint, how-
ever, and the trial court dismissed all causes of action. The court
ruled that because no final judgment existed, there was no predicate
for a Royal Globe claim."'
The Coleman court reversed, holding that a settlement pending
appeal was a sufficient "conclusion" of the underlying action for
purposes of determining if a Royal Globe action had matured.83
While recognizing that Royal Globe contemplates a conclusion of the
underlying action, and that pending final resolution of an appeal
there is no such a conclusion,84 the Coleman court nonetheless deter-
mined that a sufficient termination of the underlying action existed
on the facts of that case.8" As a practical matter, the Coleman court
was unable to distinguish between a settlement reached prior to or
during trial and one reached while an appeal is pending." In either
32. Coleman also raises other issues. For example, the heirs of the third-party claimant
sought to bring an action for violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
This cause of action was dismissed by the trial court. The court of appeal affirmed, holding
that absent an assignment from the insured, the third-party claimant (or his estate) had no
basis for such an action. 153 Cal. App. 3d at 713, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 622. Second, the Coleman
heirs argued that Gulf had maliciously prosecuted an appeal. The Coleman court upheld the
dismissal of this cause of action, observing that the appeal did nothing more than perpetuate a
"vigorous defense" and that an appeal "does not in truth seek affirmative relief." Id. An abuse
of process cause of action was also rejected. Id. at 712-13, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 624-25.
33. Id. at 715-16, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 623. The court noted: "[Tihe underlying litigation
unequivocally remains open and pending when an appeal has been taken. As a consequence,
the matter must still be amenable to a compromise good faith settlement contemplated by
subdivision (h) (5) of section 790.03. Indeed, we perceive no practical difference ... between a
pretrial statutory offer to compromise (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998), a settlement offer made
during trial and a settlement offer made during the pendancy of an appeal .... [Tihe evil
inherent in barring an Insurance Code section 790.03 action where the underlying action has
been concluded by settlement and dismissal, that insurance companies . . . might entice a
settlement by unfair practices, then seek to hide behind the cloak of that settlement . . . is the
same where the dismissal is that of an appeal." d. at 715.
34. Id. at 713, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
35. Id. at 715, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
36. Id. This result is no doubt correct because when a settlement is reached pending
appeal, there appears to be a conclusion of the action sufficient for Royal Globe purposes. See
also Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1983),
discussed infra at notes 59-76 and accompanying text.
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case, according to the Coleman court, there exists a danger that an
insurance company might obtain an unfair settlement, then seek to
hide behind such a settlement.
3 7
4. Carr v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.
The recent opinion in Carr v. Progressive Casualty Insurance
Co.38 presents an interesting variation on the conclusion require-
ment. There, following an automobile accident, the third-party
claimant brought suit against the insured and also made a demand
for the insured's policy limits. However, no offer of settlement was
made by the insurer. The third party committed suicide prior to the
resolution of the underlying action. His personal representative then
obtained an arbitration award and judgment was entered pursuant to
it 9 in an amount less than the policy limits.
Following the judgment in the underlying action, the decedent's
personal representative brought suit against Progressive, the dece-
dent's insurer. Progressive argued successfully in the trial court that
no cause of action for breach of statutory duties could be maintained
because the personal injury action was not concluded prior to the
decedent's demise. Accordingly, no cause of action "vested" which
could later be prosecuted by the personal representative.40
The court of appeal held that while an actionable claim had not
arisen during the claimant's lifetime, he did possess a cause of action
which could be passed on to his personal representative. 1 Although
the appellate court noted that the action against the insured had not
been concluded (by either settlement or judgment) during the claim-
ant's lifetime,'42 the court held that an action for breach of statutory
duties could be maintained by the personal representative."'
37. Coleman, 153 Cal. App. 3d at 715, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 623. Because of its emphasis on
protecting the insured in the context of a settlement, Coleman adopts a different approach than
the opinion in Doser, which appears to require something more than a settlement of the under-
lying action. The Coleman approach, however, tends to subject more settlements to scrutiny in
"second suits," since all that is required is that the underlying suit be "concluded" by settle-
ment and dismissal.
38. 152 Cal. App. 3d 881, 199 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1984).
39. This procedure is authorized by CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 41.23 (West Supp. 1985).
40. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 888, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
41. Id. at 890-91, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 840-41.
42. Id. at 889 n.6, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 840 n.6.
43. Id. at 893, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 842. The appellate court stated: "[Gliven (the] legisla-
tive history and statutory scheme, we conclude that a complete cause of action need not exist at
the time of the injured party's death in order for rights to survive which later may mature in
an actionable claim." Id. at 891, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
19851
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
5. Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Mazon
The Doser, Nationwide, Coleman and Carr cases represent
variations on Royal Globe actions brought in the absence of an un-
derlying "final" judgment. The opinion of the court of appeal in
Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Mazon " exemplifies the more typical
situation in which the "conclusion" issue may arise: the third party
seeks to initiate a Royal Globe action while the underlying suit is
still pending.
In Mazon, the owner of a corporation was injured while riding
as a passenger in a car driven by his employee. The owner brought
suit against the corporation and the employee alleging the negligence
of the driver. The insurer in the Mazon case, Industrial Indemnity,
filed a separate declaratory relief action alleging a lack of coverage
for the owner of the corporation because: (1) the corporate entity
was a sham; and (2) the owner was acting within the course and
scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Mazon (the
owner) cross-complained in this separate action alleging unfair in-
surance claim practices on the part of Industrial Indemnity. Indus-
trial Indemnity successfully demurred to the cross-complaint in the
trial court. 5
Although the court of appeal in Mazon recognized that not all
of the policies underlying the conclusion requirement applied to the
case before it," it held that the cross-complaint for bad faith was
indeed premature. 47 The court expressly held that the compulsory
cross-complaint rule"' did not bar Mazon from raising his cause of
action at a later time because: (1) this cause of action was not ma-
ture; and (2) bad faith was not required to be asserted in an action
for declaratory relief.49
44. 158 Cal. App. 3d 862, 204 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1984).
45. Id. at 864, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
46. Specifically, in light of the separate suit, there was no danger of evidence of insur-
ance being submitted to the jury in the underlying action. Id. at 865, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
47. Id. at 866, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 897. Cf Johnson v. Threats, 140 Cal. App. 3d 287, 189
Cal. Rptr. 447 (1983) (an insurer may be joined in action against the insured when the plain-
tiff alleges fraud or conspiracy and when the issues are bifurcated to ensure that evidence of
the existence of insurance does not come before the jury); Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065
(Mont. 1982) (action for breach of statutory duties may be filed and tried before, concurrent
with, or after liability has been determined in the underlying action); see generally ASHLEY,
BAD FAITH ACTIONS, LIABILITY AND DAMAGES § 9:09 (1984).
48. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 426.30 (West Supp. 1985).
49: 158 Cal. App. 3d at 866, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
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6. Smith v. Interinsurance Exchange
Similarly, in the recent case of Smith v. Interinsurance Ex-
change of the Automobile Club of Southern California," a court of
appeals addressed the issue of simultaneous actions against insurer
and insured. Smith involved an auto accident in which the plaintiff
was injured and her father was killed. Following the accident, the
plaintiff brought an action pursuant to California Probate Code sec-
tion 7215' to establish the liability of her father for the accident. She
alleged two causes of action in her complaint: one against her fa-
ther's estate under California Probate Code section 721, and the
other against her father's insurer for violation of California Insur-
ance Code section 790.03.
Interinsurance Exchange successfully demurred to the plaintiff's
Royal Globe cause of action in the trial court, arguing that the in-
sured's liability had yet to be established. On appeal, the plaintiff
argued that the prohibition against suing the insured and the insurer
in the same action does not apply in the context of actions brought
under Probate Code section 721 because that section authorizes a
direct action against an insurer. A court of appeals rejected this ar-
gument, however, holding that Probate Code section 721 only sim-
plifies the procedure for suing a deceased tortfeasor, and does not
authorize the naming of an insurance company as a defendant in the
underlying action."'
The Smith court also considered the policies underlying the
Royal Globe conclusion requirement. It held that the rationale of the
Royal Globe opinion applies whether the defendant in the underly-
ing action is an individual or the estate of the decedent.58 The court
further rejected the argument that, since coverage questions can be
adjudicated in an action brought pursuant to section 721 of the Cali-
fornia Probate Code, the "conclusion" requirement does not apply.54
50. 167 Cal. App. 3d 301, 213 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1985).
51. CAL. PROB. CODE § 721 (West Supp. 1985) provides in pertinent part:
[NJotwithstanding any other provision of law, the presentation or filing of a
claim shall not be required and a civil action may be maintained by a claimant
to establish, to the limits of the insurance protection only, a liability of the dece-
dent for which the decedent was protected by liability insurance ....
Id.
52. Id. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 304, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
53. Id. at 304-05, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
54. Id. at 304, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 139. The plaintiff cited in this regard Stewart v.
Bohnert's Estate, 101 Cal. App. 3d 978,162 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1980). In the Stewart case, although
the plaintiff brought suit against the decedent's estate only pursuant to CAL. PROB. CODE §
721, the court proceeded to adjudicate a coverage question in favor of the insurer. 101 Cal. App.
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The dismissal of the plaintiff's Royal Globe cause of action was
therefore affirmed.
The Doser, Nationwide, Coleman, Carr, Mazon, and Smith
cases indicate that the California Courts of Appeal have given effect
to each of the policy considerations underlying Royal Globe's conclu-
sion requirement. Certainly these opinions evidence the strong policy
against allowing actions to proceed simultaneously against insurer
and insured. 58 The opinions also indicate, however, a tendency to
require that the insured's liability be determined in the underlying
action.5 It is not clear, however, that Royal Globe contains such a
requirement."7 The presence or absence of such a requirement has
enormous impact on Royal Globe actions following settlements, as
discussed in the next section.
B. Royal Globe Actions Following Settlement Of The Underlying
Claim
Several questions arise in the context of Royal Globe actions
following settlement of underlying claims. First, is the settlement it-
self a sufficient "conclusion" or is something further required, such
as a dismissal with prejudice? Second, is a determination of liability
on the part of the insured required before the "second suit" ma-
tures? Third, should claimants be required to reserve their Royal
Globe actions in settling the underlying claim? Finally, is there any
reason to distinguish, for Royal Globe purposes, between settlements
reached during litigation from those settlements reached by the par-
ties without litigation?
How the above questions are resolved depends on the manner
in which certain judicial policies are applied. From one perspective,
allowing Royal Globe actions to be filed after any settlement-with
or without litigation, an admission of liability by the insured, or a
3d at 992, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 133. The plaintiff in the Smith case argued unsuccessfully that this
converted an action under CAL. PROB. CODE § 721 (West Supp. 1985) into a direct action
against the insurer. 167 Cal. App. 3d at 304, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
55. See supra notes 27-29, 46-49, 53-54 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 22, 28.30 and accompanying text.
57. The Royal Globe opinion mentioned the "determination of liability" issue only in
the context of discussing the reasons why a simultaneous action should not proceed against
insurer and insured. The court commented that "[u]nless the trial against the insurer is post-
poned until the liability of the insured is first determined, the defense of the insured may be
seriously hampered by discovery initiated by the injured claimant against the insurer." 23 Cal.
3d at 892, 592 P.2d at 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 850. The Royal Globe court thus appears to have
been more concerned with the danger of prejudice to the insured, than with an action proceed-
ing against an insurer without a determination of the insured's liability beforehand.
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reservation of the Royal Globe cause of action-furthers the policy of
discouraging unfair settlements by insurers."8 On the other hand,
permitting such actions tends to discourage negotiation and settle-
ment. In addition, it removes the finality to the settlement of claims,
and increases the burden on the judicial process of an explosion of
"second suits" to re-examine settlements. The following cases illus-
trate the tension between these competing social policies.
1. Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.
The "conclusion" requirement was first addressed in the con-
text of settlement by the Second District Court of Appeal in Rodri-
guez v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. 9 In reversing a ruling by
the trial court, the court held that for purposes of a third-party suit
under Royal Globe, a settlement of an action was a "conclusion" of
that action when certain other requirements were met.
In 1977, Gloria Rodriguez's car was rear-ended by a vehicle
insured by Fireman's Fund. She sustained serious injuries, and sued
the insured. Although Fireman's Fund failed to acknowledge the
plaintiff's settlement demands, the insurer did serve a statutory of-
fer"0 of $200,000, which the plaintiff accepted.6
In accepting the statutory offer, the plaintiff advised Fireman's
Fund that she was "reserving" her rights to proceed against it for
"bad faith and tortious conduct" arising from the handling of her
claim." After the statutory offer was accepted, the action was volun-
tarily dismissed with prejudice. Although no judgment was entered
after such dismissal, the plaintiff nevertheless filed a satisfaction of
judgment."'
Ms. Rodriguez then filed a Royal Globe action, alleging that
Fireman's Fund made no attempt to effectuate a prompt, fair, and
equitable settlement of her claim" and that Fireman's Fund at-
tempted to reduce her bargaining power and to coerce her into ac-
cepting the $200,000 offer. She further alleged that the accident from
which the underlying action arose was the result of the "sole negli-
58. At the same time, however, allowing Royal Globe actions following any settlement
may tend to discourage insurers from entering into such settlements. If insurers do this how-
ever, they run afoul of liability under CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5). See supra note 4.
59. 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705 (1983).
60. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 998 (West 1980).
61. Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d at 49, 190 Cal. Rptr. at
706.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5).
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gence" of the insured.65 Fireman's Fund's demurrer to the complaint
was sustained without leave to amend, and the Royal Globe action
was subsequently dismissed. Ms. Rodriguez appealed.
On appeal, Fireman's Fund relied primarily on Nationwide In-
surance Co. v. Superior Court6 in which the court held that a
third-party could not sue an insurer for "bad faith" until a judgment
had been entered against the insured. While the Rodriguez court did
not criticize the Nationwide reasoning that the preferable conclusion
to the action is a final judgment, it did point out that Royal Globe
speaks of a "conclusion" and not a "judgment.""" Applying the
broader concept of "conclusion" to Rodriguez's appeal, the court
held that an underlying lawsuit is concluded by the acceptance of a
statutory offer. "For all practical purposes, and as far as finality is
concerned," the court stated, "we are unable to discern any differ-
ence between a final judgment resulting from a trial or a final judg-
ment resulting from a settlement." 8
Fireman's Fund also argued that to permit a third-party claim-
ant to pursue an action against the insurer after settlement would
discourage insurers from entering settlement negotiations because
they would be aware that settlement might not conclude the matter.
While the court acknowledged the validity of this public policy argu-
ment, it pointed out that to prohibit a third-party from pursuing a
"bad faith" action after settlement would create the greater danger of
abuse by insurers who might entice or coerce a settlement by unfair
practices.69
As to the necessity for an admission or determination of liability
on the part of the insured, the Rodriguez court held that there are
two reasons to require such a finding: (1) to prevent the defense of
the insured from being hampered by discovery initiated against the
insurer;70 and (2) to aid in ascertaining the damages suffered by the
65. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 49, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 706. By demurring to the complaint,
Fireman's Fund admitted the truth of this allegation for purposes of testing the question of law
raised by the demurrer. Id. at 55, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 710. Thus, there was, essentially, an
admission of the insured's liability.
66. 128 Cal. App. 3d 711, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1982); see supra notes 26-30 and accom-
panying text.
67. Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d at 53, 190 Cal. Rptr. at
709.
68. Id. at 54, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 709.
69. Id. at 56, 190 Cal. Rtpr. at 711. See also Coleman v. Gulf Ins. Group, 153 Cal.
App. 3d at 713, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 623.
70. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 55, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 710. The Rodriguez court's reasoning in
this regard is unclear because this purpose is served by prohibiting a simultaneous action
against insurer and insured. What the Rodriguez court apparently intended to hold was that
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third-party claimant.7 1 The court did not address the question of
whether an admission of liability on the part of the insured is re-
quired as a predicate to analyzing whether the insurer had a duty to
settle the claim.72 Thus, it was sufficient that the liability of the in-
sured be alleged in the complaint.7
Rodriguez presents another interesting twist. Now, even when
an insurer settles a third-party liability claim, it is not protected
from the "second suit" (i.e., the extra-contract claim) from the third-
party claimant, unless the second suit is settled along with the under-
lying case.7 4 In addition, the insured also may have a claim for viola-
tion of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which he
may keep or assign to the third-party claimant in return for a cove-
nant not to execute. If the assignment is made, however, the third-
party claimant may only recover the amount of the excess verdict.7
If the insured joins in the suit, then he may assert the extra-contract
claim for compensatory damages, emotional distress, and punitive
damages as well. 76
2. Trujillo v. Yosemite-Great Falls Insurance Co.
In Trujillo v. Yosemite-Great Falls Insurance Co.,7 another
division of the Second District Court of Appeal followed the reason-
the underlying action must be "concluded" (i.e., terminated for all purposes) so that an action
against the insurer would not adversely affect the action against the insured.
71. Id.
72. The Nationwide case, for instance, seems to require that liability of the insured be
absolutely determined for the Royal Globe action to be mature. See supra notes 28-30 and
accompanying text. The Nationwide approach appears to conflict with CAL. INS. CODE §
790.03 (h)(5), which prescribes that liability be "reasonably clear." As one court has noted,
"[The insurer] argues that the phrase 'claims in which liability has become reasonably clear'
was intended to refer only to those claims in which liability is effectively undisputed, such as
rear-end collisions, situations involving strict liability and accidents where the insured admits
having run a red light. In such claims, however, it seems to us that liability is clear, not just
reasonably clear. Liability need not be effectively undisputed to be reasonably clear." Beckham
v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 691 F.2d 898, 930 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982).
73. See supra note 65.
74. The difficulty with this approach from an insurer's perspective is that it is not a
party to the underlying action and has no basis on which to insist that it be included in the
signed release. There is the possibility that an insurer which insists on a release of the Royal
Globe claim, thus jeopardizing a settlement on behalf of its insured, could be subject to liability
under the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and/or CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03
(h)(5).
75. Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976); see supra
note 3.
76. See, e.g., Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 Cal. App. 3d 783, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 200 (1975).
77. 153 Cal. App. 3d 26, 200 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1984).
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ing of Rodriguez. The plaintiff, Juan Hernandez Trujillo, alleged
that the insurer was guilty of bad faith because it insisted on an
unduly low settlement offer ($9,000, which plaintiff accepted)
designed to take advantage of the plaintiff's desperate financial situa-
tion. Plaintiff also contended that the insurer acted in bad faith for
refusing to make an "advanced payment" of $1,300.78
On appeal, plaintiff relied on the Rodriguez opinion's holding
that a bad faith action may be instituted even though the underlying
action was concluded by settlement rather than by trial and judg-
ment, provided that there was a reservation of rights to pursue the
extra-contract action.79 The court held that the plaintiff should be
permitted to amend his complaint to allege facts under Rodriguez.8°
The Trujillo opinion thus followed Rodriguez in holding that a
settlement could operate as a "conclusion" for purposes of a later
Royal Globe action. However, in elaborating on the Rodriguez hold-
ing, the Trujillo court noted that the third-party complaint should
allege such matters as: the extent of the plaintiff's damages; the pol-
icy limits of the insured; the disparity between the policy limits and
the settlement amount; and the reservation of rights by the third-
party claimant to pursue a subsequent bad faith action."
Thus, on the basis of Rodriguez and Trujillo, it appears that a
settlement of a lawsuit constitutes a sufficient "termination" or "con-
clusion" to support a subsequent Royal Globe action."2 Rodriguez
holds, however, that such a settlement should be accompanied by a
78. In responding to the advance payment question, the Trujillo court stated:
The complaint before us seems to base its claim of bad faith on the refusal to
make a $1,300 advance. We know of no duty on an insurer to underwrite an
action against its insured and plaintiff could not recover on that theory. How-
ever, plaintiff does adequately allege that the offer was intentionally too low and
a purpose [sic] to take advantage of plaintiff's impecunity; that allegation, if
true, would, given an amendment supplying the inadequacies pointed out in the
text, support a complaint apart from the $1,300 matter, which is surplusage.
Id. at 29 n.2, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 27 n.2 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 28, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 26-27. Interestingly, the court used the term, "bad
faith," to refer to a Royal Globe action, rather than a claim for violation of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing only. No claim for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing could be brought because the plaintiff was a third-party claimant and no assignment of
this claim from the insured had been described in the complaint.
80. Id. at 29, 200 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
81. Trujillo thus serves to illustrate the pleading requirements for a third-party Royal
Globe action where the underlying suit was concluded by settlement. Id. at 28, 200 Cal. Rptr.
at 27; cf. Jackson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 148 Cal. App.3d 1179, 196 Cal. Rptr.
474 (1983) (complaint contained the necessary allegations).
82. As noted above, the "conclusion" requirement should also be satisfied by settlement
in a suit by an insured for failure of an insurer to properly process a third-party claim. See
supra note 10.
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dismissal with prejudice, so that the underlying litigation is termi-
nated in all respects.
What remains unsettled, however, is whether a settlement must
be accompanied by facts demonstrating the liability of the insured in
the underlying action. This is an issue of substantial importance be-
cause settlements are often accompanied by written releases which
include statements that no admission of liability is intended by enter-
ing into such settlements. Thus, the question raised is: does every
settlement potentially subject an insurer to a later Royal Globe suit?
Further, how are settlements to be treated for Royal Globe purposes
when there has been no underlying litigation? Section C, below, ex-
amines these issues.
C. Royal Globe Actions In The Absence Of A Final Judgment Or
Settlement
1. Williams v. Transport Indemnity Co.
The Second District Court of Appeal in Williams v. Transport
Indemnity Co."3 held the absence of a sufficient "conclusion" of the
underlying action barred the third-party claimant's subsequent suit
for breach of statutory duties by the insurer. Significantly, the Wil-
liams court emphasized the need for some determination of the lia-
bility of the insured in the underlying action.
The Williams case involved an accident in which a truck owned
by the insured of defendant Transport Indemnity Company struck a
vehicle driven by the plaintiff's husband. A claim was made against
Transport Indemnity and Mr. Williams' property damages were
paid, without a corresponding offer to pay the personal injury claim.
At the time Mr. Williams made his claim, he suffered from cancer
and a heart condition which were presumably unrelated to the
accident.
The first and only offer to settle the third-party claimant's per-
sonal injuries was in the amount of $2,000, and was made by the
insurer three days before the claimant entered the hospital. The offer
was allegedly made on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis and was rejected
by Mr. Williams. Five days later he died.
Mr. Williams had not initiated any legal action to establish the
liability of the defendant's insured; nor was legal action initiated by
his estate after his death. Instead, Mrs. Williams pursued a "bad
faith" action as an individual, and as a personal representative of the
83. 157 Cal. App. 3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1984).
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estate. The complaint filed by Mrs. Williams alleged that the liabil-
ity of the insured was reasonably clear,8" and that the insurer failed
to attempt to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement, and
instead took advantage of Mr. Williams' desperate situation.
The Williams complaint contained causes of action for violation
of California Insurance Code section 790.03 and for negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress. The plaintiff pursued the causes of action
predicated on breach of section 790.03 in both her individual capac-
ity and her capacity as the personal representative of the estate of
her deceased husband. After the trial court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Transport Indemnity, the plaintiff appealed.
As in Rodriguez, much of the Williams opinion centered on
how Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court 5 was to be in-
terpreted. Specifically, the court considered what constitutes a "con-
clusion" of the underlying action for the purpose of triggering the
point at which a third-party can pursue the second suit based on
violation of California Insurance Code section 790.03. Mrs. Wil-
liams argued that Royal Globe held only that the insurer and the
insured may not be sued in the same suit, and that the case did not
hold that the insured's liability must be established in the underlying
suit prior to an Insurance Code section 790.03(h)(5) action against
the insurer. The Williams court, however, declined to accept this
reasoning, noting that the plaintiff's argument had been "persua-
sively rejected" in Nationwide Insurance Company v. Superior
Court.8
The Williams court recognized that one of the bases of the
Royal Globe opinion was that, if a simultaneous action were allowed
against insurer and insured, the defense of the insured might be
hampered by a premature action against the insurer.87 However, the
Williams court also noted that this was not the only rationale of the
Royal Globe opinion. 88 Royal Globe also recognized, according to the
Williams court, that the third-party claimant's damages could best
be ascertained after termination of the underlying action.89
The Williams court also placed great emphasis on the insured's
84. A similar allegation was made in the Rodriguez case. See supra note 65 and accom-
panying text.
85. See supra note 1.
86. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
87. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 958, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 870.
88. Id. at 958, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
89. Id.
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express admission of liability in Rodriguez.90 The Williams court
noted that the requirement of an express admission of liability fol-
lows from the fact that an insurer's obligation to settle a third-party
claim only arises when the insured has a contractual right to indem-
nification from the insurer.91
Interestingly, the Williams court was presented with facts
which might have led it to an opposite holding on the "conclusion"
issue. The statute of limitations with regard to the third-party claim-
ant's personal injury action had run, so there was no threat of an
action against the insurer interfering with the defense of an action
against the insured. The court nonetheless held that the lapse of the
limitation period was an insufficient final termination for Royal
Globe purposes, because the issue of when the liability of the insured
became reasonably clear was still unresolved for section 790.03(h)(5)
purposes. 9"
it was also suggested in Williams that payment of the property
damage claim by the insurer was tantamount to an admission of lia-
bility on the personal injury claim. The court noted, however, that a
settlement does not act as an admission of liability with regard to
any other claim arising from the incident.9"
The Williams court limited the holding of Rodriguez to situa-
tions in which two factors are present:
(1) the complaint alleges the insurer's express admission of the
insured's liability; and
(2) any settlement entered into in the underlying action was a
compromise between the insurer and the injured party.9
Williams held that the requisite degree of certainty with regard
to the amount of damages sustained by third-party claimants in the
context of a settlement is present only when the foregoing two re-
quirements are met. The Williams court was therefore very much
concerned that the liability of the insured in the underlying action be
90. Id. at 959, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72. See supra note 65.
91. 157 Cal. App. 3d at 960, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
92. In the Williams case, the underlying claim was indisputably "final" in the sense
that no action could be brought against the insured as of the time of the Royal Globe suit was
filed. Nevertheless, the Williams court held the Royal Globe action was barred, noting that the
rationale of the conclusion requirement is to provide "some means of assessing the extent of the
insured's liability and, hence, the damaging effect of the insurer's violation of its statutory
duty." Id. at 961, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 872. Under Williams, the determination of liability re-
quirement provides a means for evaluating the conduct of the insurer, as well as a device to
prevent a simultaneous suit against insurer and insured. Id. at 960-61, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
93. Id. at 960. 203 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
94. Id. at 961, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
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considered to determine whether that action was "concluded" for
Royal Globe purposes. In fact, Williams indicates that, absent a set-
tlement with an admission of liability or a judgment in favor of a
third-party, very few underlying actions may be considered "con-
cluded" so as to allow a subsequent suit predicated on breach of
statutory duties.95
III. DISCUSSION
Case law following Royal Globe indicates an evolution of the
concept of "conclusion" of the underlying action for purposes of sub-
sequent action by a third-party claimant. The concept of "conclu-
sion" has expanded to encompass settlement of the underlying action
when certain requirements, such as an express admission of liability
or a dismissal with prejudice, are met.
The status of the law on the issue of conclusion of the underly-
ing action can be summarized by noting the situations in which a
Royal Globe action can be brought:
(1) after judgment;9' or,
(2) after settlement and a dismissal with prejudice of the under-
lying action prior to trial of that action, under circumstances in
which the third-party claimant has reserved his or her rights to pur-
sue the Royal Globe claim.9
In contrast, Royal Globe actions have been denied in the follow-
ing situations:
(1) when there is no action filed by the plaintiff in the underly-
ing action, or any settlement agreement which could be interpreted
as a "termination" of that action;98
(2) when there is a judgment which is the subject of a pending
appeal;99
95. The Williams approach was followed in the recent case of Muraoka v. Budget
Rent-A-Car, Inc., 160 Cal. App. 3d 107, 206 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1984). In Muraoka, a cause of
action was dismissed for violation of CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 because no conclusion of the
underlying action was alleged, and there was no settlement or judgment upon which to predi-
cate a later statutory action. Muraoka also held that the lack of an appropriate "conclusion"
bars claims under CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h)(5). 160 Cal. App. 3d at 120, 206 Cal. Rptr. at
482.
96. Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr.
842 (1979).
97. Rodriguez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 142 Cal. App. 3d 46, 190 Cal. Rptr. 705(1983).
98. Williams v. Transport Indem. Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 953, 203 Cal. Rptr. 868
(1984).
99. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Superior Ct., 128 Cal. App. 3d 711, 180 Cal. Rptr. 464
(1982).
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(3) when there is a cross-complaint brought in a separate action
for breach of statutory duties while the underlying case is pend-
ing; '0 and,
(4) when an action is brought against a decedent's estate pursu-
ant to California Probate Code section 721, and a cause of action for
violation of Insurance Code section 790.03 is joined against an
insurer. '0
While there is now some certainty as to when a Royal Globe
action may be pursued following settlement of the underlying action,
further issues remain unresolved. These issues are:
(1) whether a Royal Globe action can be maintained if there is
an appeal which becomes final;
(2) whether a Royal Globe action can be maintained if there is
an accepted offer pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure
section 998;'0'
(3) whether a Royal Globe action can be maintained after a
dismissal without prejudice; and
(4) whether a Royal Globe action can be maintained when the
underlying action was not pursued to judgment or dismissal with
prejudice because of intervening circumstances (death, neglect, etc.).
Clearly, significant issues remain with respect to Royal Globe
actions following settlement. Specifically, the question which re-
quires resolution is what constitutes sufficient indicia of liability to
allow such actions to proceed. To allow a Royal Globe action after
any settlement offers insurers a significant disincentive to settlement.
To allow the circumstances of every settlement to be re-examined
raises dangers of opening a "Pandora's Box" of "second suits." Such
a course would place immense practical burdens upon the judicial
system and upon the insurance industry.'
100. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Mazon, 158 Cal. App. 3d 862, 204 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1984).
101. Smith v. Interinsurance Exch., 167 Cal. App. 3d 301, 213 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1985).
102. Presumably, an action would be maintainable in this instance because the underly-
ing action would be concluded or a judgment would be entered against the insured.
103. These types of "practical" burdens have been held persuasive by California courts.
Borer v. American Airlines, 19 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 53 P.2d 858, 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306
(1977), addressed a child's loss of parental consortium claim. Justice Tobriner observed that:
We cannot ignore the social burden of providing damages for loss of parental
consortium merely because the money to pay such awards comes initially from
the "negligent" defendant or his insurer. Realistically the burden of payment of
awards for loss of consortium must be borne by the public generally in increased
insurance premiums or, otherwise, in the enhanced danger that accrues from the
greater number of people who may choose to go without insurance. We must
also take into account the cost of administration of a system to determine and
pay consortium awards; since virtually every serious injury to a parent would
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In contrast, to discourage Royal Globe actions following settle-
ment might encourage insurers to force unfair settlements as a means
of avoiding liability for extra-contractual damages. In particular,
strictly interpreting the determination of liability requirement, as did
the Williams court, may shield from scrutiny some settlements which
are indeed unfair.
The California Supreme Court has the opportunity to provide
some guidance on the issue of maturity of a Royal Globe action in
the Coleman case."" The court can strictly apply the "determination
of liability" requirement as did the court of appeal in Williams v.
Transport Indemnity Co., or it can limit the Royal Globe holding
to a simple prohibition against simultaneous suits against insurer
and insured. 0 6 If the latter course is chosen, many settlements en-
tered into by insurers on behalf of their insureds will become subject
to re-examination in subsequent Royal Globe actions. In this situa-
tion, the settlement of the underlying suit can become a mechanical
requirement for bringing the second suit rendering virtually every
suit ripe for re-evaluation. The thought that every third-party per-
sonal injury claim might require two actions before it is concluded is
overwhelming in light of statistics which demonstrate that the num-
ber of personal injury lawsuits is increasing at a rapid pace.
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court should carefully balance the
policy considerations implicit in both a strict and a liberal interpreta-
tion of the "conclusion" requirement. While there are advantages to
the re-examination of settlements via Royal Globe actions (i.e., dis-
couraging unfair settlement practices), there are also significant and
costly disadvantages (i.e., numerous Royal Globe actions following
settlements of "nuisance" suits). It is therefore critical that some
compromise be struck by which meritorious Royal Globe actions are
not discouraged, yet every settlement does not become the subject of
an involved and expensive "second suit." These authors submit that
these competing policies are best accommodated by requiring some
indicia of liability on the part of the insured in the underlying action
before the second suit can be brought after settlement. This can be
engender a claim for l9ss of consortium ....
Id.
104. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
106. There is support for this interpretation of the Royal Globe opinion. See supra note
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accomplished if the courts require: 1) an implied admission of liabil-
ity (e.g., an accepted Civil Procedure Code section 998 offer), or an
express admission of liability, and 2) a dismissal with prejudice of
the underlying action. Otherwise, the courts may become inundated
with "second suits" following the underlying action.

